What Makes Parties Joint Employers? An Analysis of the National Labor Relations Board’s Redefining of the “Joint Employer” Standard and Its Potential Effect on the Labor Industry by Orekondy, Deepti
University of Miami Law School
University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository
University of Miami Business Law Review
5-1-2017
What Makes Parties Joint Employers? An Analysis
of the National Labor Relations Board’s Redefining
of the “Joint Employer” Standard and Its Potential
Effect on the Labor Industry
Deepti Orekondy
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umblr
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in University of Miami Business Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more
information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Deepti Orekondy, What Makes Parties Joint Employers? An Analysis of the National Labor Relations Board’s Redefining of the “Joint




What Makes Parties Joint Employers? An 
Analysis of the National Labor Relations 
Board’s Redefining of the “Joint Employer” 
Standard and Its Potential Effect on the 
Labor Industry 
Deepti Orekondy* 
Multiple cases decided before the National Labor Relations Board 
(“NLRB”) have continuously narrowed the scope of the joint 
employer doctrine. Most recently, in the case of Browning-Ferris 
Indus., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186 (August 27, 2015), the NLRB 
overturned decades of precedent and adopted a much more 
expansive standard that reverts the doctrine back to its original 
understanding in 1965. Prior to this decision, the joint employer 
doctrine established a joint employer relationship when both 
entities had meaningful control over the terms and conditions of 
employment and actually exercised that authority. After 
Browning-Ferris, the new standard now only requires “indirect” 
control, regardless of actualization of that authority, over workers 
for businesses to be considered employers and be responsible for 
labor disputes and negotiations. 
The new standard has far reaching implications for the labor 
industry and affects the bargaining power and rights of entities all 
the way down the chain. The changes lead to increased liability 
for employees, greater bargaining power for unions and 
employees, and a threat to the franchise business model. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The joint employer doctrine is a federal doctrine that determines 
whether two entities are both simultaneously considered employers over 
an employee.1 When a joint employer relationship exists, “both entities 
must comply with the applicable laws with respect to the employees at 
issue and are liable as employers . . . .”2 After three long decades of 
precedent establishing a standard for finding a joint employer relationship, 
the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) has decided the 
                                                                                                             
1 29 C.F.R. § 791.2 (2016). 
2 Dianne LaRocca, NLRB Joint Employer Redefinition Threatens Franchises, LAW360 
(Jan. 21, 2015, 12:40 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/613307/nlrb-joint-employer-
redefinition-threatens-franchises. 
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transformation of the doctrine over the years is baseless, and no longer 
conforms to the changes in our economy.3 
In August of 2015, the NLRB made a startling decision regarding the 
joint employer doctrine in the case of Browning-Ferris Indus.4 The result 
of this decision redefined the doctrine, leaving the labor industry in frenzy 
with employers worried about increased liability, franchisees concerned 
about a loss of independence, and labor unions high with greater 
bargaining power. 
Part I of this Comment will discuss the basic concepts necessary to 
understand the role and impact of the joint employer doctrine on the labor 
industry. Part II will review the evolution of the joint employer doctrine 
from 1965 until the present. Part III evaluates possible implications for the 
labor industry such as the increased responsibility of employers, unions 
having greater bargaining power, and the new liability placed upon 
franchisors. 
A. The National Labor Relations Act: What Does It Mean To 
Be An Employer? 
The National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) was established by 
Congress in 1935 with the intent to “protect the rights of employees and 
employers, to encourage collective bargaining, and to curtail certain 
private sector labor and management practices, which can harm the 
general welfare of workers, businesses and the U.S. economy.”5 Under the 
NLRA an employer is defined as “any person acting as an agent of an 
employer,” whether directly or indirectly.6 An employee is defined in 
essence as “any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a 
particular employer, unless [the NLRA] explicitly states otherwise,” 
which includes “any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence 
of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair 
labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and 
substantially equivalent employment,” but does not include any individual 
that is an independent contractor.7 Even though the joint employer doctrine 
is not codified, it is an extension of the NLRA. The status of joint employer 
is dependent upon whether the putative joint employer has a common law 
                                                                                                             
3 NLRB’s Joint Employer Attack, WALL ST. J.: OPINION (last updated Aug. 28, 2015, 
7:49 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/nlrbs-joint-employer-attack-1440805826; see also 
Browning-Ferris Indus., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186 at 1 (Aug. 27, 2015). 
4 Browning-Ferris Indus., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186 at 1 (Aug. 27, 2015). 
5 National Labor Relations Act, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, https://www.nlrb.
gov/resources/national-labor-relations-act (last visited Jan. 17, 2017). 
6 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2012). 
7 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012). 
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employment relationship with the employees at issue.8 Central to this 
determination is “the existence, extent, and object of the putative joint 
employer’s control.”9 
B. What Is A Union And What Is Its Role In Collective 
Bargaining? 
A union is an organization of employees of a particular workplace that 
choose to join together to work toward achieving common employment 
goals.10 The purpose of forming and joining a union is for employees to 
collectively try and improve their working conditions, such as wages, 
hours, and job safety.11 Essentially, unions unite workers and use their 
strength in numbers to create a voice for the employees and in turn are the 
vehicles used to negotiate with employers.12 Unions are valuable tools for 
employees in all work environments because it allows them to secure 
equality in all work environments and protects them from overreaching 
employers.13 
To understand the benefit of the joint employer doctrine to unions, one 
must understand the concept of collective bargaining. Collective 
bargaining is a process which workers, through their union 
representatives, can negotiate the terms of their employment contracts.14 
Before collective bargaining can occur though, the employees must 
unionize. Once employees unionize and elections are held to select a union 
representative, the representative negotiates with the employer on behalf 
of the employees.15 The representative works with employers to create a 
contract, which the employees can vote to accept or reject.16 The resulting 
contract is known as the collective bargaining agreement.17 This 
agreement is a binding contract.18 However, it is important to note that 
                                                                                                             
8 Browning-Ferris, 362 N.L.R.B. at 2. 
9 Id. 
10 Learn About Unions, AFL-CIO, http://www.aflcio.org/Learn-About-Unions (last     
visited Jan. 17, 2017). 
11 Id. 
12 What Unions Do, AFL-CIO, http://www.aflcio.org/Learn-About-Unions/What-
Unions-Do (last visited Jan. 17, 2017). 
13 See id. 
14 Collective Bargaining Fact Sheet, AFL-CIO, http://www.aflcio.org/Learn-About-




17 51 C.J.S. Labor Relations § 308 (2016). 
18 Id. 
2017] "JOINT EMPLOYER" STANDARD 119 
these agreements do not supersede or nullify any of the rights normally 
afforded to workers by law.19 
The employer, employees, and unions are all intertwined when it 
comes to the employer – employee relationship. As a result, all parties are 
affected when there is a change in the joint employer doctrine. Those who 
are now deemed to be a joint employer under the new standard may be 
subject to liability and responsibility that they had not originally 
anticipated when entering into their respective agreements and unions may 
have additional entities with which it can negotiate. 
II. EVOLUTION OF THE JOINT EMPLOYER STANDARD 
A. The “Share or Co-Determine” Standard 
The essence of the joint employer doctrine can be traced back to 
Greyhound Corp. in 1965.20 Greyhound Corp. was focused on a union 
representation issue of a refusal-to-bargain allegation that required a 
determination of whether two employers, Greyhound Corporation 
(“Greyhound”) and Floors, Inc. (“Floors”), were joint employers.21 On 
remand from the Supreme Court, the NLRB had determined that 
Greyhound and Floors were joint employers for purposes of determining 
collective bargaining units and when the two employers were called upon 
to engage in collective bargaining they refused.22 The employers believed 
that the NLRB was incorrect in determining that they were joint employers 
and as such the designated bargaining unit was not appropriate.23 
Greyhound and Floors contended that Floors was an independent 
contractor and therefore the sole employer over those workers it placed at 
the Greyhound terminals.24 Floors alleged that the bargaining unit should 
consist solely of Floors employees collectively across all the Greyhound 
terminals or each terminal should consist of separate, individual 
bargaining units.25 
Upon reviewing the service agreements between Greyhound and 
Floors, the NLRB found two statutory employers to be joint employers of 
certain workers because they “share[d], or codetermine[d], those matters 
governing essential terms and conditions of employment.”26 This decision 
                                                                                                             
19 Id. 
20 See Greyhound Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 1488, 1490 (1965). 
21 Id. at 1490–91. 
22 Id. at 1496. 
23 Id. at 1490. 
24 Id. 
25 Greyhound Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. at 1490. 
26 Id. at 1495. 
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was premised on the common control between the two regarding terms 
and conditions not limited to but including working hours, scheduling, 
number of workers needed, manner in which work is completed, and 
wages.27 The NLRB noted that the substantial influence both employers 
had over the workers qualified them as joint employers regardless of 
whether Floors was an independent contractor.28 Therefore, because they 
were joint employers, the refusal to bargain was an unfair labor practice.29 
Although this standard was established, it was not consistently applied 
until the Third Circuit endorsed it in 1982 in NLRB v. Browning-Ferris 
Indus. of PA.30 In Browning-Ferris,31 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
was required to determine whether Browning-Ferris Industries of 
Pennsylvania, Inc. (“BFI”) was a joint employer under the NLRA in order 
to determine if it was responsible for unfair labor practices.32 The court 
examined two different standards for determining employer status: the 
joint employer standard set out in Greyhound Corp. and the single 
employer standard the NLRB had used in Radio Union v. Broadcast 
Service of Mobile, Inc.33 BFI maintained that the four factor test for a 
finding of a single employer set forth in Radio Union was the correct 
standard to be applied.34 This test determined whether “two nominally 
separate entities are actually part of a single integrated enterprise so that, 
for all purposes, there is in fact only a ‘single employer.’”35 The four 
factors for a finding of a single employer include the following: “(1) 
functional integration of operations; (2) centralized control of labor 
relations; (3) common management; and (4) common ownership.”36 
In reviewing Radio Union and the additional cases BFI cited, the court 
in Browning-Ferris (1982) determined that the joint employer concept 
does not require a finding of a single integrated enterprise, and that finding 
a joint employer relationship assumes that both entities are independent 
but jointly maintain control over important aspects of the employment 
                                                                                                             
27 Id. at 1495–96. 
28 Id. at 1494–95. 
29 Id. at 1496. 
30 Browning-Ferris Indus., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186 at 12 (Aug. 27, 2015); see also 
N.L.R.B. v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of PA, Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1119 (3d Cir. 1982), 
enforcing 259 N.L.R.B. 148 (1981). 
31 It should be noted that this Browning-Ferris case was from 1982 and was one of the 
original cases that established the previous standard for the joint employer doctrine. This 
case is separate from the Browning-Ferris case decided by the NLRB in 2015. 
32 N.L.R.B. v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of PA, Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1119 (3d Cir. 1982), 
enforcing 259 N.L.R.B. 148 (1981); see also Radio Union v. Broad. Serv of Mobile, Inc., 
380 U.S. 255 (1965). 
33 Browning-Ferris Indus., 691 F.2d at 1121; see also Radio Union, 380 U.S. at 255. 
34 Browning-Ferris Indus., 691 F.2d at 1121-22; see also Radio Union, 380 U.S. at 255. 
35 Browning-Ferris Indus., 691 F.2d at 1121-22; see also Radio Union, 380 U.S. at 255. 
36 Browning-Ferris Indus., 691 F.2d at 1122; see also Radio Union, 380 U.S. at 255. 
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relationship.37 As such, the court maintained that the single employer 
standard is inappropriate and that the Greyhound Corp. “share or co-
determine” standard is best applicable.38 The court determined the fact that 
BFI shared with its “brokers” the responsibility of hiring, firing, 
establishing work hours, and compensation was substantial evidence to 
support a finding of shared significant control to determine that the parties 
were in fact joint employers.39 
The 1982 Browning-Ferris case served to clarify and untangle the 
joint employer doctrine by explaining that even though this type of direct 
authority and control was present, the NLRB did not require that this right 
be exercised, or that it be exercised in any particular manner.40 It 
established that it was sufficient for a finding of joint employer status to 
exist even if the employer merely had the ability to have direct control 
over the employees, whether or not it was exercised.41 After the Third 
Circuit’s endorsement, the standard was further bolstered when the NLRB 
adopted it in two subsequent 1984 cases.42 
B. Narrowing the Doctrine: Shift from Reserved Control to 
Actual Exercise of Authority 
The joint employer doctrine was again revamped when additional 
requirements were added that narrowed the joint-employer standard.43 The 
shift away from the reliance on “reserved control and indirect control as 
indicia of joint employer status” was evidenced by the Laerco Transp. 
decision with its emphasis and focus on the actual exercise of control.44 In 
this case, the NLRB was required to determine whether Laerco 
Transportation and Warehouse (“Laerco”) and California Transportation 
Labor, Inc. (“CTL”) were joint employers in regards to establishing an 
appropriate unit for collective bargaining.45 Laerco contested that the 
finding of joint employer status was not supported by the record and was 
a departure from NLRB precedent.46 The NLRB maintained the 
importance of the concept of separate entities sharing or codetermining 
matters essential to employment, but also established that “there must be 
                                                                                                             
37 Browning-Ferris Indus., 691 F.2d at 1122. 
38 Id. at 1122-24. 
39 Id. at 1124-25. 
40 Browning-Ferris Indus., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186 at 13 (Aug. 27, 2015). 
41 Id. at 11. 
42 NLRB’s Joint Employer Attack, WALL ST. J.: OPINION, http://www.wsj.com/articles/n
lrbs-joint-employer-attack-1440805826 (last updated Aug. 28, 2015, 7:49 PM); see Laerco 
Transp., 269 N.L.R.B. 324 (1984); TLI, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 798 (1985). 
43 Browning-Ferris Indus., 362 N.L.R.B. at 13. 
44 Id. 
45 Laerco, 269 N.L.R.B. 324 (1984). 
46 Id. 
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a showing that the employer meaningfully affects matters relating to the 
employment relationship such as hiring, firing, discipline, supervision, and 
direction.”47 Applying these requirements to the facts of the case, the 
NLRB found that Laerco’s control over CTL employees was “minimal and 
routine in nature” and was not enough to effectively control the 
employment of CTL employees.48 The major elements of employment and 
the acquisition and retention of the employees was controlled by CTL.49 
Therefore, because Laerco did not actively and meaningfully affect the 
employment of CTL employees, the NLRB found that they were not joint 
employers.50 
This requirement of exercising control was actualized in TLI, Inc. 
where the NLRB reinforced the doctrine by restating the “meaningful 
control” standard from Laerco Transp. for a joint employer relationship to 
exist.51 In TLI, Inc., the NLRB agreed with the joint employer standard set 
forth in a prior hearing by the Administrative Law Judge, but concluded 
that TLI and Crown Zellerback (“Crown”) were not joint employers.52 TLI 
served as the lessor of Crown’s transportation carrier drivers and the judge 
determined that because Crown shared some control that it was a joint 
employer.53 Crown contended that it was not a joint employer and that the 
correct standard to be applied was the four-factor test for the single 
employer standard.54 The NLRB upon review of this decision agreed with 
the judge that the single employer standard was not applicable because that 
test is only used to determine if two separate entities establish a single 
enterprise.55 The NLRB agreed with the judge that the correct standard to 
be utilized was that which was recognized by the Third Circuit, that 
“where two separate entities share or codetermine those matters governing 
the essential terms and conditions of employment, they are to be 
considered joint employers for purposes of the [NLRA].”56 Although the 
NLRB agreed on the standard to be applied, it did not agree with the court 
that Crown was a joint employer with TLI.57 The NLRB held that even 
though Crown did exercise some control over the drivers, the control did 
not reach the degree of meaningful effect upon the terms and conditions, 
                                                                                                             
47 Id. at 325. 
48 Id. at 326. 
49 Id. at 325. 
50 Laerco, 269 N.L.R.B. 325 (1984). 
51 TLI, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 798 (1985). 
52 Id. at 798–99. 
53 Id. at 798. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 TLI, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 798 (1985). 
57 Id. at 799. 
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and because it lacked authority to hire, fire or discipline as is needed, 
Crown could not be deemed a joint employer.58 
These two cases in conjunction embody the transformations of the 
joint employer doctrine that the NLRB has now reviewed and reconsidered 
under its new decision in Browning-Ferris Indus. in 2015. 
C. Refining of the Joint Employer Doctrine 
Until the recent decision by the NLRB, a joint employer relationship 
could be established so long as there was the ability for direct exercise of 
meaningful control and that such control was actually exercised. In August 
of 2015, in the case of Browning-Ferris Indus., the NLRB determined that 
with the changes in the economy and the labor industry, a revision of the 
joint employer standard was necessary. Upon reviewing the precedent, the 
NLRB found that 
[i]f the current joint-employer standard is narrower than 
statutorily necessary, and if joint-employment 
arrangements are increasing, the risk is increased that the 
Board is failing in what the Supreme Court has described 
as the Board’s ‘responsibility to adapt the Act to the 
changing patterns of industrial life.’59 
The NLRB then determined that it would be wise to go back to the roots 
of the joint employer doctrine and revisit the 1965 standard. 
1. Browning-Ferris Indus. (2015) 
At issue in the recent Browning-Ferris (2015) case is whether BFI and 
Leadpoint were considered joint employers. In the process of making such 
a determination, the NLRB considered the standard for assessing joint 
employer status under the NLRA. This case arose as a result of a 
representation petition filed on behalf of workers led by the International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, a union, which sought to represent workers 
employed by a subcontractor, Leadpoint.60 The petition asserted that 
Browning-Ferris was a joint employer with Leadpoint because it had 
contracted with Leadpoint for temporary labor.61 
                                                                                                             
58 Id. 
59 Browning-Ferris Indus., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186 at 15 (Aug. 27, 2015). 
60 Richard L. Alfred et al., How Will Browning-Ferris Change the Test for Joint-
Employer Status for Union and Non-Union Employers?, SEYFARTH SHAW: PUBLICATIONS/ 
BLOG POSTS (Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.seyfarth.com/publications/MA082715-LE. 
61 Browning-Ferris Indus., 362 N.L.R.B. at 9. 
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a) Facts 
In Browning-Ferris (2015), BFI owned and operated a recycling 
facility within which it employed approximately sixty (60) employees, 
which were part of an existing separate bargaining unit.62 BFI contracted 
with Leadpoint, a supplier firm, to provide workers to work at the BFI 
facility.63 BFI and Leadpoint had a temporary labor services agreement 
that stated Leadpoint was the sole employer of the employees it provides, 
and that no part of the agreement should be construed to create an 
employment relationship between BFI and the personnel provided by 
Leadpoint.64 BFI and Leadpoint both had its own supervisors and work 
leaders at the facility to oversee employees.65 BFI had no control over the 
hiring process of Leadpoint employees, but Leadpoint was to ensure that 
all hired personnel had the necessary qualifications with the caveat that 
BFI had the authority to request a certain standard for selection be met or 
exceeded during Leadpoint’s hiring process.66 
In terms of disciplining employees, Leadpoint maintained sole 
responsibility to counsel, discipline, evaluate, and terminate employees 
that were assigned to BFI.67 However, BFI retained the right to reject “and 
discontinue use of any Leadpoint personnel for any or no reason.”68 As for 
wages, BFI was to follow a rate schedule where it compensated Leadpoint 
for each worker, but Leadpoint was responsible for the pay rate and 
issuance of paychecks to its personnel.69 Further, Leadpoint employees 
were required to sign a waiver stating that they were only eligible for 
benefits through Leadpoint and were not eligible for any benefits through 
BFI.70 
The workflow and process was primarily determined by BFI.71 BFI 
was responsible for determining what would be done each day and where 
employees would be stationed. 72 To implement BFI’s plan, BFI provided 
Leadpoint with a target number of employees needed for that day and 
Leadpoint was in charge of assigning specific employees to specific 
stations.73 If changes needed to be made to the stationing of employees, 
BFI could direct the Leadpoint supervisors to move employees as 
                                                                                                             
62 Id. at 2. 
63 Id. at 3. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Browning-Ferris Indus., 362 N.L.R.B. at 3. 
67 Id. at 5. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 6. 
71 Browning-Ferris Indus., 362 N.L.R.B. at 6–7. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 6. 
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needed.74 Both Leadpoint and BFI provided training to Leadpoint 
personnel.75 As for safety, Leadpoint’s employees were required to follow 
BFI safety procedures and BFI had the right to enforce its safety policy 
upon Leadpoint employees.76 
b) New Joint Employer Standard 
Upon review of the pertinent facts and numerous viewpoints regarding 
the appropriate standard for finding a joint employer relationship, the 
NLRB has decided to upend thirty years of precedent and to embrace the 
1965 standard endorsed by the Third Circuit finding that “[t]he Board may 
find that two or more entities are joint employers of a single work force if 
they are both employers within the meaning of the common law, and if 
they share or codetermine those matters governing the essential terms and 
conditions of employment.”77 In addition, the decision held that the NLRB 
only requires an employer possess indirect control, and removes the need 
for exercise of that control.78 With this refining and regression of the 
doctrine, the NLRB ultimately overruled Laerco Transp. and TLI, Inc.79 
Now, the NLRB has the standard to be more expansive and as a result, 
more ambiguous. 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW JOINT EMPLOYER 
STANDARD 
Redefining the joint employer standard has transformed the scope of 
the doctrine to encompass a broader range within which to find a joint 
employer relationship. As a result, the labor industry has become 
concerned with the potential implications this may have on employers, 
employees, franchises, and labor unions because now there is greater 
likelihood that a joint employer relationship will be found.80 
To restate, after the 2015 Browning-Ferris decision the NLRB 
determined that 
                                                                                                             
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 8. 
76 Browning-Ferris Indus., 362 N.L.R.B. at 8. 
77 Id. at 19; see also Greyhound Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 1488, 1495 (1965); N.L.R.B. v. 
Browning-Ferris Indus. of PA, Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1119 (3d Cir. 1982), enforcing 259 
N.L.R.B. 148 (1981). 
78 Browning-Ferris Indus., 362 N.L.R.B. at 2. 
79 Id. 
80 NLRB’s Joint Employer Attack, WALL ST. J.: OPINION (last updated Aug. 28, 2015, 
7:49 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/nlrbs-joint-employer-attack-1440805826. 
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joint-employer status may be found where both entities 
(1) are employers within the meaning of the common law, 
and (2) “share or codetermine those matters governing the 
essential terms and conditions of employment.” This 
means that joint-employer status will be found where the 
putative joint-employer actually exercises direct or 
indirect control over essential terms and conditions of 
employment of another entity’s employees, or has simply 
reserved the right to exercise such control.81 
When a joint employer relationship is found, both entities are 
responsible for “an action due either to their actual pursuit of a common 
course in violation of the NLRA or merely by virtue of their shared control 
over labor relation matters.”82 With this change in the standard, the NLRB 
has shifted the test from finding an actual existing joint relationship to 
deeming employers as joint employers based on what their relationship 
may be expanded to encompass.83 This means that even the mere ability 
to control is sufficient for a finding of a joint employment relationship, 
whether or not it’s ever actually exercised. The Board’s decision will 
impact every sector of the labor industry that has structured their business 
based on the settled 30-year precedent of employment law with the belief 
that “absent the direct control necessary for a true employer-employee 
relationship, the entity will not be a joint employer under the NLRA.”84 
With the expanded scope within which a joint employer relationship 
can be found, there is an increased likelihood that more employers will be 
liable for unfair labor practices, unions will have greater bargaining power, 
and the essence of the franchise business model may begin to crumble. 
A. Impact on Employers 
Now that there is a greater possibility of finding a joint employer 
relationship, employers are put in the hot seat. The status of joint employer 
is not simply a title but carries with it the possibility of increased liability 
and responsibility. Joint employer status will impact the individual 
employers on a daily basis because “[t]he joint employer doctrine is 
applied mostly in unfair labor practice proceedings when two business 
                                                                                                             
81 Zachary D. Fasman et al., What Organizations Need to Know Regarding the NLRB’s 
Revised Joint-Employer Standard, 22 HR Advisor: Legal & Practical Guidance No. 1 
(2016). 
82 9 EMP. COORD. LABOR RELATIONS, WESTLAW § 4:27 (Supp. January 2017). 
83 Richard L. Alfred et al., How Will Browning-Ferris Change the Test for Joint-
Employer Status for Union and Non-Union Employers?, SEYFARTH SHAW: PUBLICATIONS/ 
BLOG POSTS (Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.seyfarth.com/publications/MA082715-LE. 
84 Id. 
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entities are charged with dual responsibility for an action due either to their 
actual pursuit of a common course in violation of the NLRA or merely by 
virtue of their shared control over labor relations matters.”85 
Essentially, once two entities are deemed joint employers, they are 
both considered the primary employer.86 As such, employers are now 
potentially responsible for all of the actions of its contractors and affiliates 
in regard to their employees.87 For example, “if a manager of the supplier 
employer unlawfully threatened a contract worker concerning activities 
protected under the NLRA (such as signing a union card), both employers 
would be liable for that violation.”88 Even though the user employer had 
no part in making the threat, because they are joint employers, the user 
employer is potentially jointly liable. 
Additionally, employers may now be obligated to take part in 
collective bargaining.89 Although this may be a benefit for employees and 
unions, employers will bear the burden. However, in terms of collective 
bargaining, the NLRB made clear that “as a rule, a joint employer will be 
required to bargain only with respect to such terms and conditions which 
it possesses the authority to control.”90 The NLRA “provides that an 
employer has a duty to bargain in good faith with the labor union 
representing its workers, must comply with the resulting collective 
bargaining agreement, and may be subjected to picketing and strikes by its 
employees.”91 
Ultimately, the change in the joint employer standard creates a state 
of uncertainty for employers because there is no clear definition for what 
constitutes “indirect control” and what acts establish sharing or 
codetermining essential terms of employment.92 As noted by the dissent, 
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the decision leaves to the Board the discretion to “give dispositive weight 
to an employer’s control over any essential term and condition of 
employment in finding a joint employer relationship.”93 Moreover, the 
dissent was quick to point out that there is no limiting factor in determining 
which relationships fall within the joint employer status.94 With no 
guidelines, employers are left to rely on the specific facts outlined in the 
2015 Browning-Ferris decision, though they are not of much help because 
it was unclear which facts were dispositive in determining the joint 
employer status.95 The lack of a clear definition in the new standard leaves 
employers to walk on thin ice and take a “hands-off approach” until it’s 
clear what actions will trigger the joint employer status.96 Until then, many 
employers are going to be caught up in litigation and will have to set the 
baseline as guidance for their peers. 
Furthermore, it is possible that if the new standard is upheld, other 
agencies such as the EEOC and state agencies will adopt the same or 
similar definition just as the Department of Labor has, which could lead to 
even further expanded liability under various federal and state laws.97 As 
an unwelcome result of the unanticipated litigation, employers will put in 
the spotlight and face scrutiny requiring them to divulge information 
pertaining to their business practices and employee relations that may 
cause them functional and financial harm.98 
B. Impact on Unions and Employees 
Further, after the NLRB decided the Browning-Ferris case in 2015 
there was much debate over what this means for unions and newly deemed 
employers. When unions are brought into the mix they are given the upper 
hand. Now, when a joint employer relationship is deemed to exist unions 
will essentially have the opportunity to negotiate with both employers, 
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regardless of the extent of their participation in those matters under which 
they have authority to control. As a result, both entities will be required to 
share in the collective bargaining negotiations and may be obligated to 
take a seat at the bargaining table when they previously may not have been 
required to do so.99 This places more responsibility on the newly deemed 
joint employers and imposes a greater risk of liability. Meanwhile, it 
provides a great benefit for employees and gives unions more power than 
they have had in the past. The unions now have more opportunity and 
reach in their bargaining power and can reach above low level managers 
and attempt to negotiate with parent companies directly. This proves to 
benefit employees because there is a greater chance that the unions will be 
able to secure more lucrative terms under the collective bargaining 
agreements when they have the opportunity to bargain with entities higher 
up the chain of command. 
Over the past year of debate regarding the implications on unions and 
collective bargaining, the labor industry received some clarity when the 
NLRB decided Miller & Anderson100 in July of 2016. The NLRB 
continued its streak of making drastic changes to employment law and 
overturned precedent regarding collective bargaining units and returned to 
a prior standard established in M.B. Sturgis, Inc.101 (“Sturgis”). 
Prior to Miller & Anderson, union units were allowed to be composed 
of mixed workers102 but such a unit required the consent of both employers 
involved.103 Now, after Miller & Anderson, as long as a joint employer 
relationship is found, a union bargaining unit may be formed “between the 
actual employees of a business and the employees of a subcontractor 
without employer consent.”104 Although this particular issue has fluctuated 
over the past years, because of the recent Browning-Ferris (2015) 
decision, it has become of heightened importance. Now that the joint 
employer standard has been loosened and there is greater potential for a 
joint employer relationship to exist, there is also a greater likelihood of 
having unions that are composed of a mix of a company’s own employees 
as well as those of a joint employer.105 The caveat, however, is that there 
must be a shared community of interest in order for a single bargaining 
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unit composed of both solely and jointly employed workers to be 
appropriate.106 The appropriateness will be determined by application of 
the traditional community of interest factors.107 
After both Browning-Ferris (2015) and Miller & Anderson, there is a 
much greater possibility of having mixed bargaining units. As such, in 
Miller & Anderson the NLRB held that a user employer is only required 
to bargain with unions regarding all the terms and conditions of 
employment for unit employees it solely employs.108 However, for those 
employees who are jointly employed, the employer is only obligated to 
bargain over the terms and conditions for which it possesses the authority 
to control, again regardless of whether that control is ever actually 
exercised.109 With these recent decisions at play, unions have been given 
the upper hand and employment law leans towards favoring organized 
labor.110 
However, in the Browning-Ferris (2015) decision the dissent was 
quick to point out that under the NLRA the NLRB is expected to foster the 
stability of labor relations and “encourage the practice and procedure of 
collective bargaining.”111 From the dissent’s perspective, loosening the 
joint employer doctrine does not work to achieve this goal, but rather is a 
step backwards and creates an area of unsettled law when the Supreme 
Court has stressed the need for certainty.112 The resulting ambiguity of 
these decisions leaves employers and unions in fear or of later evaluations 
that lead to labor violations or unfair outcomes.113 
Moreover, with the possibility of multiple employers at the bargaining 
table, the dissent recognizes the immense problem that has now evolved, 
which was never contemplated by Congress.114 With multiple employers 
bargaining with the unions, there is a chance for greater confusion and 
inability to create a collective bargaining agreement that meets the needs 
and interests of all parties involved.115 The dissent offers an example of a 
Cleaning Company that contracts with three separate Clients A, B, and 
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C.116 Under the new joint employer standard, the Cleaning Company is 
considered a joint employer with each of the Clients A, B, and C.117 If the 
Cleaning Company’s employees choose to unionize, it creates a whole 
host of problems not limited to the confidentiality between each client and 
the Company, the interests and needs of each client and the Company in 
relation to all their employees, and the conflicts that may arise as a result 
of inconsistency between employment contracts and the collective 
bargaining agreements.118 These are a few among the many potential 
issues that arise as a result of the loosened standard. Although as new case 
law is established some of these issues are resolved—like the Miller & 
Anderson case which resolved the issue of multiple versus single 
bargaining units—many new issues arise as a result. Ultimately, it leads to 
muddled interpretations on the part of all parties involved to find a way to 
mesh these decisions into a coherent and navigable playing field. 
C. Impact on Franchise Businesses 
On a similar note, with unions having greater power over bargaining, 
franchise businesses are left to scramble because, with a relaxed standard 
within which to find joint employer status, franchisors can now be 
“declared the employers or joint employers of their franchisees or their 
franchisees’ employees.”119 As a result, this has become “a tactic designed 
to make large franchisors the economic ‘bargaining unit’ with which 
unions may negotiate on behalf of the franchisees’ employees.”120 To 
understand the impact Browning-Ferris (2015) will have on the franchise 
business industry we must understand how they operate. 
1. How Do Franchise Businesses Operate? 
The franchise business consists of “a business model that involves one 
business owner licensing trademarks and methods to an independent 
entrepreneur.”121 Here, the business owner being the franchisor and the 
independent entrepreneur being the franchisee. The relationship between 
the franchisor and franchisee is governed by a Franchise Agreement that 
outlines the terms, conditions, privileges, and other important details of 
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the relationship.122 Franchisees typically are responsible for daily tasks and 
must operate in accordance with the Franchise Agreement.123 In return for 
the benefit of use of the franchisor’s branding and trademarking, the 
franchisee must agree to meet the quality and standards required by the 
franchisor.124 
2. Increased Liability for Franchisors and a Loss of 
Independence for Franchisees 
Although the NLRB did not explicitly state that the new joint 
employer standard requires that franchisors are joint employers with its 
franchisees, the dissent established that the decision effectively does just 
that—even if the potential joint employer only possess indirect control.125 
If the dissent is correct and franchisors are considered to be joint 
employers, this will drastically change the franchisor-franchisee 
relationship and may lead to the decline of the franchise business model.126 
As a result, there will be a vast impact on the economy because there are 
nearly nine (9) million Americans who work at franchise businesses.127 
Previously, franchisee owners were the only party solely responsible for 
those that they hire, were the only party with which unions could bargain, 
and were the only party liable for claims of unfair labor practices. Now, 
with the possibility of franchisors being considered joint employers over 
the franchisee’s employees, the franchisors are considered primary 
employers.128 Consequently, the union has the ability to not only bring the 
franchisee to the bargaining table but also the franchisor. 
This places an increased burden on the franchisor because they now 
may be indirectly liable for the actions of the franchisee’s employees. This 
shared concept of liability is better understood by considering the doctrine 
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of respondeat superior.129 Under this doctrine, “an employer is vicariously 
liable for the negligence of an agent or employee acting within the scope 
of his or her agency or employment although the principal or employer has 
not personally committed a wrong.”130 Under the theory of respondeat 
superior, joint employers are now fronted with shared liability and risk 
they never anticipated. 
Essentially, the essence of owning a business and having the 
independence to manage the company as one pleases is undercut by this 
new joint employer standard. The shared responsibility limits the 
independence of the franchisee to run the company as they wish because 
they are no longer able to solely make the decisions regarding their 
employees.131 They will likely have to consult with the franchisor, because 
now that the franchisee’s actions bear weight on the franchisor’s liability, 
franchisors are more likely to be concerned about the franchisee’s actions, 
resulting in more corporate control.132 Without a finding of joint employer 
status, franchisee owners could run their business as they wanted, of 
course in accordance with the Franchise Agreement, but they alone would 
be responsible for any repercussions or unfair labor violations. Now, 
franchisee owners who may be deemed joint employers with the 
franchisors will have to worry about the effect their decisions may have 
on the franchisor. Similarly, franchisors who may now be held accountable 
for franchisee actions may set strict policies and guidelines on the actions 
franchisees may take, essentially undermining the spirit and autonomy of 
franchise business operations. 
With this decision, the franchisor and the franchisee will be required 
to work together rather than just remaining independent business partners. 
It is not definite that all franchise businesses will be subject to the joint 
employment doctrine as there was no definitive mention of the effect on 
franchise business in the Browning-Ferris (2015) decision. However, as 
the dissent implies, it is likely that most will because the franchisor most 
often sets the standard of quality and service required. Further, under the 
new standard this type of control over the employment conditions, whether 
actually exercised or not, seems sufficient to establish the franchisor as a 
joint employer of the franchisee employees. 133 
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Ultimately, in deciding the Browning-Ferris (2015) case the NLRB 
stated that the previous joint employer standard was no longer reflective 
of our economic circumstances, especially with the recent increase in 
contingent employment relationships.134 As a result, franchisors no longer 
have the protection they previously enjoyed and now have to be hyper 
aware of all the decisions their franchisees are making.135 Likewise, 
franchisees have to walk on eggshells to make sure that they are not going 
to harm the franchisor while trying to maintain their own autonomy in 
making decisions for its independently owned franchise. The outcome is 
going to result in overwhelming litigation with plaintiffs working their 
way up the chain and chasing after franchisors’ “deep pockets.”136 
Moreover, it may lead to the chilling effect of business owners choosing 
to forgo the franchise model altogether, or otherwise, it may lead to 
franchisors only granting franchisees to businesses that may be more 
fiscally reliable and capable of handling the corporate control.137 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As a result of the NLRB’s decision to redefine the joint employer 
standard, businesses must revisit their agreements and assess the 
possibility of joint employer liability. Although there is no single solution, 
these relationships and agreements will need to be viewed in light of the 
new joint employer standard to avoid any unexpected liability.138 To avoid 
such liability and potential responsibility for collective bargaining, 
businesses can proactively work to modify existing relationships and look 
for guidance from the anticipated NLRB decisions that are expected to 
clarify and interpret the new standard. Moving forward, businesses can 
make sure when creating new relationships that there is clear distinction 
as to which party is going to be the primary employer responsible for 
controlling the “essential terms and conditions of employment” so as to 
avoid the possibility of a joint employment relationship. 
The NLRB’s recent decisions have created a whirlwind for the labor 
industry and have everyone on their feet trying to figure out whether they 
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may now be considered joint employers and preparing for the changes and 
inevitable rush of litigation that will likely ensue as a result. With new 
changes on the horizon after the 2016 Presidential elections, the labor 
industry will have to work together to interpret the NLRB’s decisions and 
put the pieces together to establish the current framework of employment 
law until the NLRB provides clear guidance on the matter. 
 
